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By Rosemary Kelanic Dr. Kelanic is the director of the Middle East program at Defense Priorities. See more of our coverage in your search results. Add The New York Times on Google

When President Trump isn’t threatening to make the Strait of Hormuz a U.S. territory, his administration is demanding that the strait revert to being a free international passageway for the world’s oil supply. The president needs to face reality: Neither of these things is going to happen. The strait needs to be reopened, even if that means Iran tolls transit through it. This outcome would be a defeat for the United States. But, at this point, it is the least bad option. The war with Iran has revealed two things: Iran cannot completely close the Strait of Hormuz, and the United States cannot completely open it. Despite months of pummeling from American bombs and missiles, Tehran has shown it can still discourage tanker traffic in the strait, through which a fifth of the world’s oil supply transited before Mr. Trump attacked Iran in February.

Hormuz is a 90-mile-long, horseshoe-shaped gantlet that enables the countries sitting on either side — Iran to the north and Oman to the south — to potentially disrupt shipping. Its rugged coastline provides ample haven for precision-guided Iranian missiles, drones and attack boats to menace vessels with “shoot and scoot” tactics that are impossible to decisively defeat. Iran can produce such weapons cheaply and indefinitely, making Iranian attack an endemic risk of crossing Hormuz that even a negotiated deal with Tehran would not eliminate. Private shippers have balked at risking crews and cargoes for less-than-perfect security, which has allowed Iran to suppress traffic without attacking every vessel attempting to cross. Even with U.S. military assistance that has depleted munitions and strained the navy, only about five million barrels of oil per day have crossed the strait without express Iranian sign-off, compared with roughly 20 million barrels per day before the war. Long-term, American-led operations to sneak oil through Hormuz would risk U.S. casualties and burden American taxpayers. The U.S. public would be rightly skeptical about bankrolling free access to countries unwilling to help open the strait, when those countries could pay their own way through tolls. Financially, transit fees are a better deal for the United States and the world than a prolonged semiclosure of the strait. While the recent resilience of world oil markets has surprised many, the daily supply deficit of up to 14 million barrels per day at the war’s height has cut deeply into global crude and product inventories. This has slowly exhausted the buffers that have kept oil prices only modestly elevated over prewar days. If the Hormuz standoff causes oil prices to spike, the economic damage could be severe, especially for the United States, whose economy is far more oil-intensive than those of other great powers like Russia and China.

As embarrassing as Hormuz taxes would be for the United States and for Mr. Trump personally, monetizing safe passage would encourage Iran to allow through as many ships as possible so it can collect more tolls. And if Iran grows dependent on revenue from administering the strait, closing it in the future for political reasons becomes more difficult. Iran is already in talks with Oman about the strait’s future. Joint custodianship of the waterway could foster regional cooperation and spur Iran to demonstrate responsibility by mellowing its rhetoric and behavior. It could eventually allow Iran to rejoin the international community, conferring recognition that would make it easier for Iran to surrender its nuclear program, which functions as an alternative source of prestige. Charging tolls would benefit Iran financially, but even high-end revenue estimates would leave Iran behind given the $270 billion in war damages it has suffered. If Iran collects $6 billion to $14 billion in transit fees annually, as some estimates suggest, it could take nearly 20 years for Iran to break even on the war. Over that span, market adjustment would diminish the importance of Hormuz, as regional exporters constructed bypass pipelines and the switch to electric vehicles reduced oil demand.

Yes, allowing Iran to control Hormuz would set a bad precedent, encouraging other countries adjacent to chokehold shipping corridors to assert control over them. But what happens in Hormuz will most likely stay in Hormuz; its unique geography and market importance for transporting Persian Gulf oil have no analogue to other waterways. The Yemen-based Houthis could not realistically copy Iran’s Hormuz gambit because they control only a fraction of the Red Sea coastline, and their missile, drone and targeting systems are significantly less capable than their Iranian counterparts. The 2023 to 2025 Houthi campaign against shipping in the Red Sea reduced transits, but substantial amounts of cargo continued to cross the channel. Most Houthi attacks caused little to no damage. Shippers also had a viable workaround: rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope, adding marginal fuel costs of only about $1 million per vessel.

All taxation is a protection racket, according to prominent social scientists. History shows that those who can provide security — or threaten consequences — over a geographic area often impose political authority and taxation on that zone. And Iran has shown it already has substantial control over Hormuz. None of this is optimal for the United States. But the sooner we accept this new reality, the better for consumers, the world economy and regional stability. Perhaps the consequences of lasting Iranian authority over the Strait of Hormuz will even dissuade future U.S. presidents — or Mr. Trump — from launching risky and unnecessary wars.