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Interesting project, thank you for introducing. :)
I haven’t tested anything, but only checked their specs (sadly I didn’t find out how they manage without a distributed hashtable).
Reticulum does not use source addresses. No packets transmitted include information about the address, place, machine or person they originated from.
Sounds like mix networks like I2P and (to a lesser degree, since its role is proxying out to the Internet) like TOR. Mix networks send traffic using the Internet, so the bottom protocol layers (TCP and UDP) use IP addresses. Higher protocol layers (end to end messages) use cryptographic identifiers.
There is no central control over the address space in Reticulum. Anyone can allocate as many addresses as they need, when they need them.
Sounds like TOR and I2P, but people’s convenience (easily resolving a name to an address) has created centralized resources on these nets, and will likely create similar resources on any network. An important matter is whether the central name resolver can retroactively revoke a name (in I2P for example, a name that has been already distributed is irrevocable, but you can refuse to distribute it to new nodes).
Reticulum ensures end-to-end connectivity. Newly generated addresses become globally reachable in a matter of seconds to a few minutes.
The same as aforementioned mix networks, but neither of them claims operability at 5 bits per second. Generally, a megabit connection is advised to meaninfully run a mix network, because you’re not expected to freeload, but help mix traffic for others (this is how the anonymity arises).
Addresses are self-sovereign and portable. Once an address has been created, it can be moved physically to another place in the network, and continue to be reachable.
True for TOR and I2P. The address is a public key. You can move the machine with the private key anywhere, it will build a tunnel to accept incoming traffic at some other node.
All communication is secured with strong, modern encryption by default.
As it should.
All encryption keys are ephemeral, and communication offers forward secrecy by default.
In mix networks, the keys used as endpoint addresses are not ephemeral, but permanent. I’m not sure if I should take this statement at face value. If Alice wants to speak to Bob tomorrow, some identifier of Bob must not be ephemeral.
It is not possible to establish unencrypted links in Reticulum networks.
Same for mix networks.
It is not possible to send unencrypted packets to any destinations in the network.
Same.
Destinations receiving unencrypted packets will drop them as invalid.
Same.
P.S.
I also checked their interface list and it looks reasonable. Dropping an idea too: an interface for WiFi cards in monitor/inject mode might help some people. If the tool gets popular, I’m sure someone will build it. :)
Yep, indeed, I’m already discovering differences too. :) A good document for techies to read seems to be here.
https://reticulum.network/manual/understanding.html
I also think I see a problem on the horizon: announce traffic volume. According to this description, it seems that Reticulum tries to forward all announces to every transport node (router). In a small network, that’s OK. In a big network, this can become a challenge (disclaimer: I’ve participated in building I2P, but ages ago, but I still remember some stuff well enough to predict where a problem might pop up). Maintenance of the routing table / network database / <other term for a similar thing> is among the biggest challenges when things get intercontinental.